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ABSTRACT 
Traditional authorities are powerful leaders alongside the state in Ghana. The chieftaincy has been 
resilient to “modernization”—maintaining land rights, allegiance from citizens, and influence in rural 
communities. Nonetheless, there are few rules defining their official role in the local government 
structure. It is empirically acknowledged that chiefs seriously impact the development of their 
communities. Hence, this study looks for factors that might explain the state’s deficiency in policy 
regarding chiefs. This analysis combines the Institutional Analysis and Development (IAD) framework 
with theory on formal and informal rules. Not only does this adaptation provide additional insight, but it 
helps to reduce the complexity in political research on dual governance bodies. Findings suggest that the 
formal and informal rule sets coupled with the resources available to state and customary actors result in 
strong exchange organizations between the two institutions. Incentives encourage noninterference and 
avoidance from the state; thus, rules concerning the chieftaincy are rarely enforced or modified. If 
attempting to harness collaboration and mitigate conflict and collusion, the state—in partnership with the 
chiefs—might reconsider the lawful role and authorities of the chiefs at local levels. Based on the 
analysis, policy revisions are needed to improve the outcomes of the institutional arrangement; however, 
major changes may be difficult to achieve in the current political context. 
Keywords:  decentralization, customary law, incentives, rules, state system, traditional authority 
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1.  INTRODUCTION AND OBJECTIVES 
And yet the beard has come to meet the eyebrow. – Ga Traditional Proverb 
Unlike the beard, whose bristled hairs come poking through the pores in adolescence, the eyebrow—
forever placed on the human face—appears even before birth and often never feels the jagged edge of a 
razor. The eyebrow, experiencing every year of a person’s life, acquires wisdom and understanding far 
quicker than the unstable and late-blooming beard, whose unpredictable color and growth rate can put a 
damper on the morning of any hurried businessman. The eyebrow is all-seeing and never-changing. The 
beard is not. 
This proverb was originally intended to reprimand rebel youth attempting to outwit their elders. 
Now it serves another purpose, even years after Ghana’s independence: to remind the government that the 
traditional authorities have been around far longer than postcolonial rulers. Chieftaincy in Ghana, as a 
result of the country’s history, law, and political environment, has been—to a great extent—ignored in 
genuine policy debates in the last decade. Indeed, it is considered one of the most empowered traditional 
institutions today, particularly because the chiefs own 80 percent of all land rapidly expanding in value. 
Yet even despite its apparent influence and increasing power, most policies regarding the authorities of 
the institution have not changed since the implementation of Ghana’s Constitution in 1992. More 
importantly, empirical research examining the institution’s actual effects on economic development is 
limited. 
The ill-defined role of the customary leaders in modern Ghanaian government is not a new 
discovery. Nor is the conclusion that these leaders do indeed continue to influence both political and 
economic outcomes (Daanaa 2010; Logan 2009; Mahama 2009; Ubink and Quan 2008; MLGRD Ghana, 
2007; World Bank 2007). In fact, a number of analysts have found that while seemingly irrelevant at the 
national level in Ghana, chiefs are acutely germane at the local level (Logan 2009; Daanaa 2010; 10 
2010).
1
Exploratory in nature, this study attempts to uncover exactly how the behaviors of contemporary 
chiefs affect communities in Ghana today and for what purposes the state and customary institutions 
interact with one another. Informant interviews and Net-Map, which is a tool to help clarify “social 
networks … and collect data about the perceived power of different actors within a policy field” (Schiffer 
and Waale 2008), were used to collect information on the relationships between the district assembly and 
the traditional leaders. It was hoped that by gathering detailed descriptions of projects or conflicts from 
multiple actors, researchers might be able to link interactions between the state and chiefs to development 
outcomes. This qualitative design was also used to search for possible explanations for the continued use 
of vague rules regarding chiefs’ authority and roles. Finally, researchers wanted to more broadly fill some 
 This finding likely extends beyond Ghanaian boundaries, as traditional leaders are present and 
powerful in many communities from South Africa to Indonesia and Canada. Although there is evident 
need for policymakers and researchers to formally clarify the role of the traditional authorities, 
specifically in local settings, this has not been done in many developing countries. Decentralization—
meaning here the process of moving decisionmaking powers of the central government closer to the 
people—implies local politics, participation, and development. Yet decentralization literature says little 
about the management of and interaction with traditional leaders and systems present in local governance 
arenas. As will be illustrated, this is a noteworthy gap in decentralization theory and practice. 
                                                       
1 To protect the identity of interviewees, respondents will be cited with reference numbers, instead of names, as follows: By 
region and district: A=First Northern district; B=First Western district; C=Second Western District; and D=Second Northern 
District . By institution and position: district chief executive=1, district assembly member=2, unit committee member=3, 
divisional chief=4, subchief=5, caretaker=6, queen mother=7, clan head=9, expert=10, mine representative=11, executive 
officer=12. Finally, by community: first interviewed=1, second interviewed=2. (See Section 4, “Methodology,” for additional 
information.) For example, a divisional chief from the Western Region, second district in the second community interviewed 
would be cited as C.4.2 and alphabetized accordingly in the reference list. When the overwhelming majority of interviewees are 
cited, no direct quote will be given. 2 
of the gaps in empirical literature relating to chiefs in decentralized systems. Thus the following questions 
were asked: 
•  What is the contemporary role of the traditional authorities, and what are the implications for 
development outcomes and local government effectiveness? 
•  What powers do the chiefs retain, and what is the source of it? 
•  How do state and customary actors interact, and why? 
•  To what extent would a different formal structure or policy make better use of the 
opportunities and reduce possible conflict? 
Given the complex institutional arrangements in Ghana, an adapted version of the Institutional 
Analysis and Development (IAD) framework is used to structure and analyze the findings. Because this 
study addresses dual governing institutions, additional theory is incorporated into the IAD framework. 
Recent scholarly work has highlighted the need to separate formal rules or institutions from those 
informal in political research (Helmke and Levitsky 2004; Knight 1992; Lauth 2000). However, informal 
rules are often framed as the customary norms or traditional body in a given society. This poses problems 
for research in countries like Ghana, where both strong state and customary bodies coexist. In this 
context, both institutions maintain their own sets of formal and informal rules, which are particularly 
acute at the local level. Thus in order to analyze the effectiveness of decentralization policy and local 
government structure, we separate rules into four categories. This provides a much more comprehensive 
approach to the analysis. Given such complexity in rules and interactions between the state and customary 
actors, we also integrate incentives and exchanges into the framework. Douglass North’s transaction cost 
theory of exchange as well as social exchange theory help to clarify the incentives that shape the 
interactions between the two institutions. 
Broadly, our findings suggest that scholars and policymakers should stimulate a more open 
dialogue on the official role of chiefs in local government systems. For one, chiefs clearly influence 
development outcomes and local government structure in Ghana. More importantly, the dual incentive 
structures that motivate both the state and customary bodies illustrate why state formal rules have not 
been modified in recent years. In essence, because incentives lock the coexisting governing institutions in 
a competitive arrangement, state and customary actors will either retain or exchange their assets in 
attempts to maintain power over the other. Though some exchanges result in negative development 
outcomes, revising law could reduce asset maximization for some actors. As a result, these actors steer 
clear of invoking policy change. Collaboration between the two institutions appears the most beneficial 
for communities in need of development. However, collaborative efforts occur only under certain 
conditions. 
After providing a brief history and some background on decentralization theory and its 
applicability to Ghana, the conceptual framework and methodology are reviewed in depth. Subsequently, 
the findings on resources, formal and informal rules in both the state and the chieftaincy, and incentive 
structures are discussed. We then explore the patterns of interaction—collaboration, noninteraction, 
collusion, and conflict within the chieftaincy—and the conditions under which they occur. Finally, we 
present hypotheses that might help to predict the interactions and exchanges between the state and the 
customary institution. Policy implications are briefly discussed in the conclusion. 
   3 
2.  MOTIVATION 
A brief political history of chieftaincy in Ghana, a review of the current perceptions concerning chiefs 
today, and their relevance in decentralization practices are all important aspects of this discussion. 
Previous debates on each of these matters have bounced between ideologies of the “modernists” and the 
“traditionalists” (Keulder 1998), and between the “trivialists” and the “romanticizers” (Oomen 2000). 
Chiefs have also been called the source of gender inequalities (Ribot 2001; Vijayalakshmi 2002). The rise 
of local government in developing countries provides new reasoning for their exclusion, including that the 
empowerment of alternative authorities undermines the function and legitimacy of the new democratic 
ones (Ribot 2003; Ntsebeza 2007). Nonetheless, the chiefs continue to influence society and the 
government. This is a serious matter as the lack of correspondence between formal institutions and 
society’s norms or values will likely result in weak and ineffective institutions (North 1990a). 
Traditional leaders were responsible for the daily administration of their people (Mahama 2009) 
long before colonialists hit the rich soil of the Gold Coast. Yet as early as the mid-1800s, their duties were 
congealed as the British bestowed upon them an “official” role within the colonial government (Buah 
1980). Chiefs collected taxes, managed community affairs, and liaised with the colonialists on matters of 
trade (Owusu 2006), using their local knowledge for colonial benefit. Some suggest that even the growth 
of rural capitalism further intensified this role, as it accentuated indigenous social and political hierarchies 
(Boone 2003). However, in the mid-1900s, the nationalist movement began. Kwame Nkrumah, the first 
president of independent Ghana, established a decentralized nationalist administration (Mahama 2009; 
Boone 2003) to curtail the power of the chiefs, who were now his political opponents. Coupled with this 
strategy were growing theoretical suppositions that modern (political) office would become more 
important than traditional leadership (Steegstra 2005). As power tensions rose, the ideological separations 
of modern government and traditional leadership solidified (Ribot 2001). 
After a series of coups from 1966 to 1981, Lieutenant J. J. Rawlings of the Provisional National 
Defense Council ascended to power, suspending both the constitution and all politics. In the early 1990s, 
Rawlings began to revolutionize legal order by revising the constitution and creating the Local 
Government Act (LGA). This was done without chiefly participation, and thus their political party 
prohibition was maintained (Koranteng and Larbi 2008). In 1996, when Rawlings suggested that chiefs 
finally be permitted to participate in partisan politics again, public pushback was immense. This example 
demonstrates the normative separation of politics and traditions so evident in the brief historical account 
given above; some findings suggest that the widely shared image of the “good chief” is always 
nonpartisan (Lentz 1998). As demonstrated, this nonpartisan image originates from the power struggle 
during the independence era. Reinforcing this notion is the role of chiefs as vote brokers (Ubink and Quan 
2008), which certainly incentivizes the government to enforce nonpartisanship. 
Current public perceptions are also relevant. As noted previously, many have confirmed that 
contemporary traditional leaders influence their communities and development. This is also well 
represented in surveys and media. Table 1 presents important findings from a chieftaincy study in Ghana 
that surveyed almost 3,000 people (Abotchie 2006) in 2006. As displayed, 90 percent of respondents still 
believe that chiefs can contribute to economic development. 
Table 1. Perceptions of traditional authorities 
Perceptions of chiefs, in Ghana  % 
Chiefs unify the community.  90 
Chiefs should continue their traditional roles.  77 
Chiefs contribute to ethnic conflict.  60 
Chiefs contribute to national unity.  80 
Chiefs can contribute to economic development.  90 
Chiefs do not have respect of the community.  43 
Source: Abotchie 2006. 4 
Another recent study conducted in six African countries (not including Ghana) found that the 




 Using factor analysis on data from an Afrobarameter survey, Logan creates indexes for 
perceptions of various governance bodies like Parliament and the executive branch. She also generates an 
index for traditional leaders. This index includes topics about how trustworthy, attentive, and corrupt the 
chief is in the respondents’ perspective. Through regression analysis (see  ), Logan finds that the 
perceptions of traditional authorities are positively linked to perceptions of other government leaders. In 
fact, it is strongest when compared to the local government officials (Logan 2009). Most surprisingly, 
positive perceptions of traditional authorities are related to democratic principles, like voting. 
Table 2. Regression results: Explaining the perceptions index of traditional authorities  
(Constant)  B (unstandardized) 
Index perceptions of executive government  0.065** 
Index perceptions of Parliament  0.069** 
Index of perceptions of local government  0.200*** 
Urban or rural (1/0, rural excluded)   0.090 
Vote matters   0.024* 
Work for a candidate or party   0.047* 
Source: Logan 2009. 
Note: * P < 0.05. ** P < 0.01. *** P < 0.001. 
Thus if chiefs can contribute to economic development and are positively associated with 
democracy and local government, what does this mean for decentralization efforts? Ghana was formally 
decentralized in 1992, and its success is frequently debated. Although the decentralized system allocates 
some administrative and fiscal responsibilities to the district assemblies, they are actually quite limited in 
their decisionmaking powers (Ayee 2004; Crook and Manor 1998). District assemblies are not permitted 
to borrow money from the federal government without the approval of the Ministry of Finance (Ayee 
2004), to transfer staff without consulting central authorities (Boone 2003), or to demand that 
bureaucratic agencies such as the Ministry of Education or the Ministry of Health take action on projects 
(Koranteng and Larbi 2008; Ayee 2004). The assemblies have minimal funds as well. The insufficient 
district assembly common fund and poorly yielding taxes leave little revenue for projects (Koranteng and 
Larbi 2008; Ayee 2004). As a result of these inadequate authorities and resources, elected assembly 
members are often left to one strategy to achieve community development: liaising and bonding with the 
district chief executive (DCE). The appointed DCE retains considerable decisionmaking power in the 
assembly; thus one of the only ways of ensuring that a project comes to one’s community is by supporting 
his political party. As will be illustrated, the constraints of the assembly members help to explain why and 
how chiefs with power and resources can influence development efforts and alter local government 
structures. 
Finally, those studying the shortcomings and successes of Ghana’s decentralization do not often 
examine the real impact of the customary authorities in the local government structure. This is surprising, 
as many central governments and development agencies integrate chiefs into the state administration by 
way of decentralization processes (Alexandre 1970; Lund 1998; Mawhood 1983). Moreover, there seems 
to be gaps in empirical literature on how chiefs in general distort social welfare and elected official 
accountability. For example, although decentralization outcomes are difficult to quantify, scholars agree 
that there are some factors that either make or break them. Social welfare distortions—where certain 
groups receive special treatment (Bardhan and Mookherjee 2006)—are considered some of the breaking 
factors. Yet none of the widely acknowledged social welfare distortions include the effects of traditional 
authorities or preexisting governance bodies. Two additional obstacles to the success of decentralization 
are poor incentive structures and ineffective accountability mechanisms; these are both reflected in the 
state and customary bodies in Ghana.
                                                       
2 It should be noted that only respondents who said that they have a traditional leader participated in the survey. 5 
3.  CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK 
Upon indentifying the acuteness in which traditional authorities influence the local government and 
development outcomes, we chose a framework that captured the various institutional arrangements and 
the factors that influence them. The IAD framework provides an adaptable backdrop for the study. The 
framework has undergone extensive changes and additions since its creation in 1982 (Ostrom 1999) and 
still proves useful for institutional analysis today. We made significant changes to the framework, as seen 
in Figure 1, most of which are compatible with the authors’ original intentions. 
Figure 1. Institutional Analysis and Development framework, modified 
 
Source: Adapted from Ostrom, Gardner, and Walker 1994; Ostrom 1999. 
Helmke and Levitsky (2004) recently suggested that most comparative research on institutions 
focuses primarily on formal rules and institutions, ignoring those informal. This is a problem in 
governance research as “scholars who fail to consider [these] rules of the game risk missing many of the 
important incentives and constraints that underlie political behavior” (Helmke and Levitsky 2004, 
abstract). Yet there are additional scholarly assumptions that hinder thorough analysis of political 
institutions. Customary institutions, from the Western perspective, are typically considered informal. Yet 
this is not the case in Ghana. On the contrary, customary institutions clearly maintain both formal and 
informal rule sets just like the modern state. Hence, in this context and in other colonial settings where 
customary institutions are empowered, comprehensive analysis requires differentiation between both state 
and customary institutions, as well as formal and informal rules. Given this fact, we replace the general 
rules-in-use in the IAD framework with these more specific rule sets: state formal, state informal, 
customary formal, and customary informal. 
The IAD framework can be combined with many theories (Ostrom 1999). Given this flexibility, 
we also add incentives to the framework. In this study, these incentives are grounded in transaction cost 
theory of exchange and social exchange theory. As will be demonstrated, the findings suggest that 6 
depending on the resources available and the rules-in-use in a given situation, state and customary actors 
will exchange resources with one another according to the strength of the incentives present in their 
interaction. These exchanges are not limited to tangible objects like consumer products (North 1990b). In 
this context, actors can exchange income for values, votes, promises, and expectations. The causes for 
these exchanges are split into two main variables: the actor’s motivation and his or her environment 
(North 1990b). We find that these motivations (or incentives) are generated by the rules-in-use and 
resources available (or the environment). The combination of the three variables—the resources available, 
the rules-in-use, and incentives—thereby result in specific patterns of interaction between the two 
institutions. These patterns of interaction, which highlight how the state and customary institutions 
interact, are the focus of this study due to their influence on development outcomes and local government 
performance. The following section describes in more detail the uses and intentions of the variables in 
this adapted framework. 
Resources Available
3
The resources available are defined as the assets that each actor possesses in a given interaction. In the 
original IAD framework, these resources—called physical conditions and community attributes—
represent the overarching environment that sets the scene for the actors’ behaviors and motivations 
(Ostrom 1999). In this study, resources are limited to only those that each actor holds in his possession; 
they are either retained or exchanged for another resource in the action arena. Resources are defined this 
way because of their relevance in explaining why and how customary and state institutions interact with 
one another. (Although the overarching environment indeed affects the interactions as well, our findings 
were not sufficient to include in the analysis.) The specifics of these political, monetary, positional, and 
pardoning resources will be addressed when discussing the findings. 
 
Rules-in-Use 
Ostrom, Gardner, and Walker (2004) provide a useful paradigm regarding the rules-in-use in the IAD 
framework. Acknowledging that some rules are hard to conceptualize, the authors provide “rule 
configurations” that help sort the many rules used in a given society. These rule configurations include 
entry and exit rules, authority rules, information rules, and a number of others (Ostrom 1999). However, 
because this analysis examines two prominent institutions, rules will only be categorized into the four sets 
displayed in Figure 1. 
Most of the current literature on rules and institutions assumes that “actors’ incentives and 
expectations are shaped primarily…by formal rules” (Helmke and Levitsky 2004, 725). Yet informal 
rules certainly influence the incentives. Using a matrix, Helmke and Levitsky illustrate that formal–
informal institutional interactions produce complementary, accommodating, competing, and substitutive 
outcomes. The effectiveness of the formal rules and the extent to which the informal ones diverge from 
them can help to predict these outcomes (Helmke and Levitsky 2004). While these four outcomes are 
useful when studying one institution, they are not as effective when studying two, both of which maintain 
formal and informal rules. Moreover, because most of the formal state rules discussed in this study appear 
ineffective or unenforced, the matrix is not as helpful. North (1990b) suggests that both types of rules and 
their enforcement define the opportunities of the actors in a given interaction. This enforcement becomes 
important to our findings. 
   
                                                       
3 These resources are generated from observations and interviews, as well as supporting literature discussed within the 
paper. 7 
Formal Rules 
State formal rules are the constitutional, legislative, and administrative rules (Sabatier 2007) in a society. 
They are the “procedures [or regulations] that are created, communicated, and enforced through channels 
widely accepted as official” (Helmke and Levitsky 2004), and are also known as the “rule of law.” State 
formal rules may be founded on the customary preexisting rules, or created without them (Helmke and 
Levitsky 2004, 727). This is why customary formal rules are important in colonial contexts. In Ghana’s 
case and in others, the state institution was created seemingly alongside of these rules. As a result, the 
chieftaincy stood and still stands as a dual governing institution with its own set of rules. Thus the 
customary formal rules today are the rules still used within the chieftaincy. These rules are important 
because they structure the intrainstitutional behavior of the traditional leaders. 
Informal Rules 
Informal rules are equally as important as the formal rules. States often lack the ability to enforce their 
formal rules (Tsai 2007). This leaves an open window for powerful informal rules, which can be defined 
as traditions and other norms of behavior (Dia 1996; Pejovich 1999) that are enforced through unofficial 
channels (Helmke and Levitsky 2004). These rules are typically more difficult to change through policy 
intervention because they are deeply embedded in the codes of conduct in all society (North 1990a; Ribot 
2001). Helmke and Levistsky (2004) define these rules quite specifically, distinguishing them from 
organizations, political parties, and weak institutions. But for our purposes, informal rules will not be so 
clearly delineated. This is done for two reasons: (1) defining them so specifically does not add value to 
the analysis, and (2) most of the informal rules—even though some are simply violations of the formal 
rules—are ingrained in norms and values of the society. This means that even if the formal rules are 
enforced, the informal rules that allow leaders to participate in unpopular or illegal activities might 
continue to influence interactions and encourage unconstructive exchanges (Helmke and Levistsky 2004). 
The state informal rules and customary informal rules, as they interact with the formal, influence 
development outcomes and consequences. It should be stated here that these informal rules, while 
pertinent to both exchanges and interactions, will not be part of our final hypotheses in the conclusion. 
Incentives 
The resources available to state and customary actors coupled with the rules-in-use in their environment 
generate incentives that prompt exchanges between the customary and state actors. These incentives are 
constant in every interface, yet they vary in strength depending on the context. The four incentives present 
and influencing all interinstitutional exchanges and interactions in Ghana are mutual threat, moral ethics, 
political reward, and resource gain. Before discussing each of these in the findings, some theoretical 
review is necessary. Social exchange theory and North’s transaction cost theory of exchange exemplify 
the importance of these incentives in generating exchange organizations and reinforcing dual governance 
bodies. These theories provide the foundation for why the state and customary institutions coexist and 
interact with (or avoid) one another, and they are discussed here and in Section 5.4, “Patterns of 
Interaction.” 
A Darwinian lens assumes that inefficient institutions are weeded out over time, hence leaving 
humanity with a gradual evolution of more efficient forms of economic, political, and social organization 
(Alchian 1950). However, this does not appear to be the case, as inefficient institutions that stagnate or 
reduce economic productivity continue to function in many contexts. North (1990a) and Ostrom, Gardner, 
and Walker (1994) argue that imperfect information, ideology, path dependence, and high enforcement or 
monitoring costs prolong the survival of these institutions. Thus these topics become essential to our 
analysis. Path dependence partially explains the existence of dual institutions. In colonial contexts, 
traditional and state agents are almost always equally present in the daily lives of citizens; this 
coexistence occurs because “the initial set of institutions … created interest groups with a stake in the 
existing constraints” (North 1990a, 99). Yet interest groups are not the only ones embracing both the state 
and customary bodies. Even despite possible inefficiencies, the public will ideologically rationalize their 8 
function, thereby reinforcing the incentives (North 1990) for leaders to maintain the status quo. These 
incentives that reinforce the institutional structure also prompt exchange between actors. 
Action Arena 
The action arena is simply where the incentives, rules-in-use, and resources produce an interaction 
between the state and the customary institution. Examples are used to support our findings on the patterns 
of interaction. These examples are the action arenas, in which interactions and exchanges occur between 
actors. 
Patterns of Interaction 
Patterns of interaction are the focus of this study. In each community visited, four interactions between 
the state and customary institutions were visible. The rules-in-use, resources available, and incentives 
produced collaboration, noninteraction, or collusion between state and customary actors. Though it is not 
an interaction between the two institutions, conflict within the chieftaincy is also included due to its 
prevalence and development consequences. Each of these interactions results in state and customary 
actors either exchanging or retaining their resources. The following theoretical underpinnings help to 
explain why these exchanges occur. Yet before introducing the patterns of interaction further, it must be 
clarified that although chiefs gave land or finances to the community or state in all of the communities 
visited, contribution is not considered a pattern of interaction. This is because contribution results in 
highly divergent and unpredictable development outcomes. More importantly, chiefs can contribute and 
collude, contribute and collaborate, or contribute and conflict with one another. This indicates that 
contribution is more a behavior of a chief that can be integrated into any interaction with the state body. 
North, in a sort of “utilitarianism” approach, suggests that when parties own their assets, “they 
have incentives to maximize the potential gains from exchange” (North 1990b, 187) while minimizing 
cost (Molm, Takahashi, and Peterson 2000). In Ghana, each resource in the adapted IAD framework can 
be considered an asset owned by the state or customary actor involved in the interaction. Thus, state and 
customary actors form exchange organizations in an attempt to maximize the utility of their assets. These 
exchanges usually involve complementary resources (Koranteng and Larbi 2008). For example, an 
elected state official might turn a blind eye to a chief engaging in illegal behavior in order to gain the 
chief’s community voter support. Neither the chief nor the state official could easily achieve this by using 
only personal assets. However, unlike in pure economic exchange, where prices are set and exchange 
processes are clear, the actors in social exchanges cannot flawlessly measure their benefits and risks. Blau 
(1986) explains that exchange in this context involves the principle that while one person does another a 
favor and a general expectation of some future return exists, its exact nature is not always stipulated in 
advance (Blau 1986). Social exchange—defined as the exchange of activity, tangible or intangible, and 
more or less rewarding or costly, between at least two persons (Homans 1961)—certainly pertains to this 
discussion. Homans’s social exchange and North’s institutional exchange seem to parallel each other in 
premise, as both suggest that interactions are produced by one actor’s behavior, reinforcing the other’s 
and vice versa. 
Finally, interactions and exchanges result in both positive and negative economic and social 
outcomes. These exchanges have transaction costs, some of which are significant. Monitoring and 
enforcing institutional exchanges can be quite expensive (North 1990b; Ostrom, Gardner and Walker 
1994); thus in many political settings they are not monitored. This is likely the case in countries with 
traditional and state systems. For one, trying to effectively monitor all of the interactions between the 
chiefs and state would likely be difficult and costly, not to mention that the incentives to avoid close 
supervision of these exchanges are high. This has serious consequences for relationships between the 
institutions. Without supervision, the state and the customary institutions face even more uncertainty in 
their exchanges, which leads to self-interested and competitive behavior. Thus it can be assumed that 
customary and state actors will cheat, steal, or conceal information from each other if it leads to a higher 9 
payoff in a given exchange (North 1990b). Moreover, this uncertainty encourages the actors to not 
interact with one another if the risk is too great. 
Outcomes 
Outcomes are a main focus in the original Ostrom, Gardner, and Walker (1994) framework. While they 
will not be discussed in-depth in this paper, some outcomes pertaining to the effects of the customary and 
state interactions will be mentioned when reviewing the patterns of interaction. The outcomes most 
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4.  METHODOLOGY 
In 2008, the International Food Policy Research Institute and World Bank (2010) conducted a large 
quantitative household survey in six districts and three regions in Ghana.
5
   
  After careful consideration, we 
selected two districts that were surveyed in this household questionnaire.  This was done with the 
intention of making available additional important data (that is, poverty levels, age dispersion, citizen 
participation in meetings) that could not be captured in this qualitative case study.  The two districts are 
located in the Northern and Western regions.  These regions were selected based on their resources (the 
Northern region being resource poor and the Western, resource rich) in order to observe how revenue 
affects chief and state interactions. The interview guide was made to focus quite specifically on only 
interactions between the government and traditional authorities. After initial scoping interviews were 
conducted, we realized that focusing on areas with interesting cases (like conflict between actors) could 
provide more insight on this topic.  Therefore we selected two additional neighboring districts, one in 
each region, to learn more about state and chief interactions.   A total of eight communities—two in each 
district—served as the centers of each case, where the corresponding district assembly member, subchief, 
unit committee members, and other key informants were interviewed. Complementary interviews were 
conducted with various district executives and experts as well. More than 40 interviews were conducted, 
and 13 Net-Maps were collected. 
                                                       
5 This survey collected information from approximately 1,000 households, community members, and service providers. The 
data included questions on water supply, agriculture extension, political activities, assets, and other relevant information. Both 
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5.  FINDINGS 
Formal and Informal Rules-in-Use 
In Ghana, state and customary institutions are more or less parallel structures. To help visualize their 
structure, Figure 2 provides a generalized diagram illustrating their similarities.
6 Please note that the 
physical boundaries of the state and chieftaincy are different from one another.
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Figure 2. General illustration of government and chieftaincy structures in Ghana 
 The four rule sets 
described in the conceptual framework are discussed following. 
 
Source: Author’s creation. 
State Institution 
Formal Rules: The Constitution, Chieftaincy Act, and Local Government Act 
The two most important legal documents summarizing the state’s formal rules regarding traditional 
leaders are the 1992 Ghana Constitution and 1971 Chieftaincy Act. The 1993 Local Government Act, 
while imperative to the functions of the local government, does little to address the role or authority of the 
chiefs in the decentralized system. 
The Ghana Constitution first states, “Parliament shall have no power to enact any law which … 
detracts or derogates from the honor and dignity of the institution of chieftaincy” (Ghana Parliament, 
1992, 270.1). It also prohibits chiefs from participating in active partisan politics (Ghana Parliament, 
1992, 276.1). The divisional and paramount chiefs that sit in the National House of Chiefs (NHC) and 
Regional Houses of Chiefs (RHC) oversee the activities and land transfers in their traditional areas; they 
are also to “undertake the progressive study, interpretation and codification of customary law … and 
compile the customary laws and lines of succession applicable to each stool or skin” (Ghana Parliament, 
1992, 271.3). Currently, there are 193 Traditional Councils and 10 Regional Houses, which are state 
institutions run by civil servants (Ghana Parliament, 1971, 6.1, 1.1). However, they are not always treated 
as such. In 2006, all civil servants except those working in the Traditional Councils were given a salary 
raise (Anamzoya 2008). Briefly, although Ghana also has a state judicial system, the National, Regional, 
and Traditional Councils are responsible for performing judiciary functions through the state as well. 
These functions include but are not limited to resolving chieftaincy disputes and sanctioning people for 
committing crimes like theft and adultery (Ghana Parliament, 1971, 12). 
                                                       
6 It should be noted that not all traditions mirror this exact structure. The example does not include other types of traditional 
authorities such as caretakers. 
7 Accurate maps of the traditional areas are not available because borders have not been demarcated. 12 
The Ghana Constitution also frames property rights and the processes for collecting lease rents. 
The Office of Administration of Stool Lands (OASL), a state-run agency, is to “collect rents, royalties, 
dues, [etc.]” (Ghana Parliament, 1992, 267) for all land rents and distribute them to the appropriate 
beneficiaries. It should be noted here that a “stool land” is the territory of a divisional chief. There are 
typically a number of stools in a “traditional area,” which the paramount chief oversees. The revenues are 
dispersed based on a constitutional formula: 10 percent remains with the OASL for administrative 
purposes, 25 percent goes to the stool (or the Traditional Council) for its maintenance, 20 percent goes to 
the traditional authority (or divisional chief), and the remaining 45 percent is allocated to the district 
assembly in which the stool lands are situated (Ghana Parliament, 1992, 267.7). Notably, the Ghana 
Constitution and other laws do not require the traditional authorities to publicly share how they use these 
land rents and royalties. The OASL and the Lands Commission are also to consult the chiefs “in all 
matters relating to [the stool’s] administration and development” (Ghana Parliament, 1992, 267). It should 
be mentioned here that these rents and royalties are not the only revenues that chiefs receive for leasing 
land to others. They also receive “drink money,” which will be discussed shortly. 
According to the 1993 Local Government Act, the elected district assembly members, just like 
the chiefs, are not permitted to align with a political party. However, the appointed DCE, who oversees 
and provides the final say for the decisions of the district assembly, is allowed to participate and openly 
support political parties. This is important to note when discussing the resources available to state actors. 
Beyond the DCE and civil servants, the district assembly includes “one elected representative from each 
electoral area within the district … and other members not being more than thirty percent, who are 
appointed by the President in consultation with the traditional authorities and other interest groups in the 
district” (Ghana Ministry of Local Government, 1993, 242.A, italics added). The last clause in this article 
is the only reference to the actual role of traditional authorities at the local level. Article 10 defines the 
duties of the district assemblies (which often mimic the role patterns of the traditional authorities). They 
are responsible for the following
8
•  Supporting productive activity and social development in the district 
: 
•  Initiating programs for the development of basic infrastructure 
•  Initiating joint participation with any other people to execute development plans 
•  Monitoring the execution of projects and evaluating their impact on the people’s development 
and the local and district economy 
•  Cooperating with the appropriate national and local security agencies for the maintenance of 
security and public safety in the district (Ghana Ministry of Local Government, 1993, 10.1–
10.7) 
Informal Rules That Encourage Violation of the Formal: Drink Money and Partisanship 
Chiefs also maintain informal property rights alongside the formal. These informal property rights are 
considered rules of the state because the state is the body that has authority to change these rights and 
rules. “Drink money” is a payment that a land leaser makes to the chiefs in addition to paying rent to the 
OASL (Ubink and Quan 2008). This payment was originally intended to show appreciation for the good 
stewardship of the landowner (or chief). Before land increased in value, this appreciation actually came in 
the form of drinks. One or two bottles of Schnapps were sufficient to show gratitude (Ubink and Quan 
2008). However, as demand for land has risen, so has the price of drinks. Chiefs now collect an up-front 
cash payment from companies, foreign investors, and even nonindigenous citizens, which now represents 
the market price for land leases (Wily and Hammond. 2001). The OASL does not account for this money, 
and the chiefs are not lawfully required to disclose the amount they receive from leasers. In effect, it has 
become income of the traditional authorities. 
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Since independence, Ghana has developed partisanship that has led to the politicization of 
numerous nonpolitical activities. Today the country is a two-party system with serious voting blocs. 
Informal rules generated by socioeconomic and geographical factors reinforce these voting blocs 
(Akramov and Asante 2009; Fridy 2007). Ethnicity influences partisanship as well. Populous groups like 
the Ewe consistently support the National Patriotic Party (NPP); most Ashantis espouse the National 
Democratic Congress (NDC) (Akramov and Asante 2009; Fridy 2007). Party politics also influence how 
the district assembly performs. Partisanship encourages the DCE to assist assembly sympathizers more 
often than those in the opposition. Even when district assembly nominees lose in elections, if they are 
party activists, there is that evidence they are frequently appointed to the assembly (Ghana and 
Development Partner 2007). These partisan rules, particularly in district leadership, result in the 
politicization of many community development activities. 
Finally, although formal state rules do not exempt chiefs from criminal punishment, there appears 
to be a strong hesitancy to sanction them when they commit a crime. This is partially due to the 
“noninterference” constitution clauses and the respect that chiefs retain in communities (Crook 2003). 
Moreover, the customary consequences of sanctioning an accused chief are grave: Their breaking the law 
results in their automatic destoolment (or impeachment). Thus politicians and police are cautious to arrest 
or report chiefs for illegal activities. Due to their role as vote brokers, chiefs can also damage the careers 
of politicians who allow their arrest. 
Customary Institution 
Formal Rules: Succession, Traditions, and Rank 
Group cultures and traditions are complex in Ghana. With more than 100 ethnic divisions and stool lands 
(Salm and Falola 2002), traditional systems vary greatly. While many customary formal structures today 
follow those in Figure 2, there are still vast differences between groups. Some traditions have kings and 
others do not. Some traditions are matrilineal and others are patrilineal. In most cases, the divisional or 
paramount chief has authority over the land; however, in others, clans or family heads retain this power 
(Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada 2002). It should be noted here that despite slight differences 
in who owns or oversees the land, OASL revenues always go to the divisional chief, who is the authority 
over the stool land. It is then up to the chief’s discretion if and how these revenues are dispersed to 
subchiefs. On the other hand, drink money is more flexible. This payment typically goes to whatever 
chief manages the land.
9
As a result of traditional differences, customary laws also vary. Even before colonialism, stools 
had their own unwritten constitutions that outlined the qualifications of the chief, who is permitted to sit 
as king, and how the gates should rotate (Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada 2002; Brukum 
2004). Succession is a key feature of this formal customary law. In most traditions, succession rotates 
through “gates,” or a cycle of successors. For example, if a divisional chief died and his title was open, a 
royal family member from the appropriate gate would be selected to fill his position. These gates rotate 
each time a traditional position becomes available. The number of gates is not absolute; rather it is 
defined by the number of royal families in a given area. As will be illustrated, some succession is 
automatic, and in other cases it is not. As a result, forms of succession greatly impact chiefly conflict. 
These divergent customs and intertraditional formal rules make state regulation difficult. However, there 
have been attempts by the NHC to legalize some of these norms, such as succession, for the purpose of 
preventing conflict (Yaro 2010). These laws have not been passed through Parliament (Daanaa 2010). 
 Nonetheless, it can be assumed that drink money goes to higher-ranking chiefs 
when transactions involve expensive land or large investments, even if a subchief oversees that property. 
Policing the community is also considered a customary formal rule because the state gives some 
judicial authorities to the chieftaincy. This can be quite useful where state police are not stationed in 
communities (A.12 2010). In one community, a subchief fines individuals who commit crimes like theft 
and adultery. Interviewees agreed that the community respects these fines “because it keeps the youth 
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under control” (C.3.1 2010). Policing the community is important in this study because it gives the chiefs 
authority and an elevated social status. 
Informal Rules That Encourage Violation of the Formal: Politicization and Partisanship 
Partisanship is also present in the customary institution’s informal rules. Chiefs’ participation in party 
affairs is well known, but both state and customary actors will avoid admitting this.
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Finally, royalty dispersion is also considered an informal rule as distributions change based on 
traditional leaders’ personalities and ideologies. As aforementioned, it appears that to whom and how 
divisional chiefs give royalties and drink money varies throughout the stools. Thus it can be assumed that 
informal rules within each stool dictate this dispersion. 
 Mahama actually 
states that “a disturbing percentage of traditional authorities are actively involved in politics” (2009, 12). 
Though quick to deny this finding, almost every interviewee stated that the public knows which party the 
chief supports. Although referendums have repeatedly considered allowing chiefs to participate in 
politics, there are strong arguments against this change. Shouting, “Every government is my 
government!” a subchief affirmed that if he were to support one party, then when the opposition came 
into power, the district assembly would stop assisting him and his community (C.5.1 2010). Also 
contributing to chiefly partisanship is the personal history of a chief. We encountered a number of chiefs 
who, preceding their enstoolment, were political activists or district assembly members. Thus they carried 
a strong political history into their traditional position. 
Resources Available 
Again, the resources available to both customary and state actors serve as assets that are used to maximize 
potential in exchanges and interactions.
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Incentives that Prompt Resource Exchange 
 In Ghana, it appears that political resources are often in the 
hands of the chiefs. Because chiefs continue to sway voters, the traditional authorities will “sell” votes in 
exchanges with the state. Both state and customary actors own monetary resources. Royalties and 
revenues, as well as government allowances, go to both institutions; depending on context and scope, 
these finances can be used in an exchange as well. Possessing positional resources is equivalent to having 
a higher-than-normal social status. Being popular, seen, and respected in communities appears to be 
important to both state and customary leaders. At the local level, elected district assembly members seem 
to typically retain a higher social status compared with the subchiefs because citizens expect much more 
from them. Thus the local state actors often control this resource. If a subchief contributes to a district 
assembly project, the chief usually receives praise from the district assembly member, which in turn 
increases the chiefs’ visibility in the community. In abstract form, this can be viewed as a financial-for-
positional status exchange. Finally, the ability to turn a blind eye or to pardon an individual can also be 
viewed as a resource. It is an asset typically owned by the state, as it is up to state actors to enforce the 
rule of law. If a chief is involved in illegal activity, a state actor can pardon the chief in exchange for 
votes or monetary resources. 
The rules-in-use and the resources available to actors generate the incentives for interaction (or 
noninteraction) between the state and customary institutions. The following paragraphs describe these 
incentives that encourage patterns of interaction between the two bodies. These incentives are derived 
from economic, sociological, and anthropological concepts; yet they are also tailored to fit Ghana’s 
political and institutional context. Essentially, these incentives serve as an implicit chessboard for every 
state and customary interaction: In every opportunity for exchange, the traditional and state authorities 
weigh their potential gains against their risks in consideration of the four incentives below. 
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Resource Gain 
Resources themselves are only one part of the environment that creates the motivation for interaction; 
another incentive is the actual act of obtaining resources. This incentive is well known in economic 
theory. The state actor is motivated to interact with the customary institution based on the resources the 
chief has available. If these resources are complementary, the state actor will exchange his or her 
resources for those owned by the customary actor. The same goes for the customary actor looking to 
increase or expand resources. 
Political Reward 
Political reward is fairly straightforward and is also founded in economic principles. State actors are 
incentivized by reelection and votes; traditional authorities seek higher ranks in the NHC, RHC, or 
Traditional Councils. Subchiefs might also receive supplementary royalties or support from divisional 
chiefs if they make an active attempt to empower the customary institution. Both the state and customary 
institutions consider these political rewards when they interact with one another. 
Moral Ethics 
Moral ethics also serve as an incentive for both the state and customary institutions. This incentive 
provides a more sociological approach to understanding why actors make certain decisions. All 
interviewees, particularly when discussing traditional authorities, spoke of maintaining cultural respect 
and stewardship in their communities or districts. This desire to make ethical decisions and uphold morals 
is apparent in both bodies. It is likely that these ethics, or the desire to appear morally committed, stems 
from traditional and perhaps religious belief systems. Thus historically and still today, many communities 
expect their subchiefs to be good stewards (Mahama 2009). This same expectation translates to state 
actors—bringing projects and development to the community is a primary duty of the district assembly 
member. Both state and traditional leaders who do not uphold (or at least do not appear to uphold) these 
cultural moral obligations are not typically viewed as popular leaders. 
Mutual Threat 
Both institutions face an internal threat in the current institutional structure: each other. This mutual threat 
is not always acknowledged, nor is leading to an impending institutional death for either the state or the 
customary institution. However, the threat does serve as an incentive to keep one another in check and is 
quite visible in the attitudes of interviewees. In Ghana, it can be assumed that the state democratic 
government has the upper hand over the chieftaincy. However, because the traditional leaders retain most 
of the property rights, they are still a source of competition for the state. The public seems to view both 
institutions as a source of authority; thus in a sense, there is a constant possibility that one institution 
might become far more powerful than the other. 
Table 3 summarizes the incentives that serve as a foundation for exchanges and interactions 
between the state and customary institutions. 
Table 3. Incentives that motivate both the state and customary institutions in Ghana 
Source: Author. 
Incentive  State  Customary 
Resources  Looking for political or monetary 
resources 
Looking for positional, pardon, or monetary 
resources 
Political Reward  Motivated by reelection and votes  Motivated by higher rank in chieftaincy 
Moral Ethics  Morally maintain elected leadership 
position  Morally maintain traditional stewardship 
Mutual Threat  Customary institution still has authority  State institution has more authority 16 
Patterns of Interaction 
After analyzing the findings, it became evident that particular patterns of interaction between the state and 
customary institutions were observed in every community. Resources, rules, and incentives that generate 
the four interactions are described below, using examples from the field as supporting evidence. Before 
discussing these interactions, it is important to briefly note that trends in the behaviors of the chiefs were 
also apparent. These positive roles include contributing resources, mobilizing the community, resolving 
disputes, and giving land. On the other hand, negative behaviors like gate disputes and bad land transfers 
led to stalled projects, reduced investment, and corruption. These behaviors and their consequences will 
be further visible in the interactions between the state and customary actors. 
Collaboration 
Defining Collaboration 
The first pattern of interaction observed between state and customary institutions is collaboration. 
Collaboration occurs under specific circumstances; however, it seems like the most difficult interaction to 
explain. Collaboration is viewed as an important part of district development; however, interviewees 
could not provide practical examples of it. The DCEs and civil servants in both regions verbalized the 
necessity of the chiefs; one stated: “Traditional authorities are major stakeholders. We want to consult 
them—no matter what we do, we must consult them” (B.12 2010). Another explained that “politicians 
need to keep a good rapport with chiefs and build a relationship with them” (C.12 2010); when DCEs 
enter communities, they meet with the chiefs to inform them of their purpose (A.1 2010). Most chiefs feel 
that they have a good relationship with the district assembly. They often describe their relationship with 
state actors as “cordial.” In one case, a clan head felt that the he and his assembly member are like father 
and son (A.9.1 2010). All in all, the relationships between the government officials and the traditional 
authorities are quite amiable and informal. Yet from the interviewees’ perspectives, the chiefs only 
collaborate in community development projects if the state requests their assistance. 
In this regard, it appears that collaboration is largely viewed as “contribution” in Ghana. This 
means that when a chief gives land or revenues, he is perceived as collaborating (A.9.1 2010; B.2.1 
2010). As aforementioned, we distinguish between these two actions because chiefs’ contributions can 
have both positive and negative outcomes simultaneously. However, in collaboration, outcomes are 
always positive. Development activities seem to increase as subchiefs become more actively involved in 
each of their communities,
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Examples of Collaboration  
 while information sharing results in more efficient projects seen in these 
collaborative cases. Thus, collaboration in our view is a steady process of interaction—where both the 
state actor and traditional authority use time and resources toward a joint development purpose. In the 
first collaboration example provided below, all interviewees reported that the subchief, district assembly, 
and unit committee members formally meet every three weeks, demonstrating a high-level partnership 
unseen in the other cases. This would be an example of collaboration. The opposite case is more typical, 
where meetings are not frequent or standardized (C.1 2010). 
Two field cases illustrate collaboration.  The first one describes the processes of achieving electrification 
in the community. Beginning in 2002, the district assembly member and community requested their 
Member of Parliament (MP) and a mining company providing development assistance to provide the 
necessary equipment for electricity. After the equipment was received, the Ministry of Energy hired a 
contractor to erect the poles, and five years later the infrastructure was complete (C.2.1 2010; C.3.1 
2010). However, after only three months of electricity, the Electricity Company of Ghana (ECG) pulled 
the plug. Evidently, the community was missing one small but very important piece of the 
infrastructure—the meters. Without the ability to measure the electricity used, ECG refused to provide the 
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energy. Thus the district assembly member and the unit committee pressured the ministry and the district 
assembly to finance the missing meters, but after three years, the situation had not improved. Resources 
and energy exhausted, and the district assembly member went to share her woes with the community’s 
subchief. 
Following their discussion, the subchief provided fuel money and other needed equipment to the 
district assembly member to assist in achieving electrification. He and his elders also sent letters and 
made personal visits to the regional ministry (C.5.1 2010; C.2.1 2010). As a result, all of the interviewees 
expect the meters to come to the community this year. This was not the only donor and advocacy work 
the subchief had taken part in since the district assembly member contacted him. He also purchased two 
computers for the school after overhearing that the government encouraged all communities to have them 
available to students. More importantly, he levied the community for donations to purchase two more: 
After publicly contributing five cedi (US$3.50), he asked the parents whose children attend the school to 
contribute the same. 
Collaboration was similarly apparent in other communities within the same stool and district. In 
another case, the subchief also mobilized his community to donate five cedi toward roofing materials 
(D.2.2 2010). This was after the district assembly provided funding for only half of the needed equipment. 
Before beginning the interviews in this particular community, we met with both the chiefs and the district 
assembly member in the same room. When we asked to interview the leaders separately, both stated that 
separation was unnecessary because they always work together and share all information. 
Explaining Collaboration through Rules and Resources 
The only existing state requirement on collaboration between the state and the customary institutions in 
the district is found in the LGA. As aforementioned, district assembly appointees are supposed to be 
selected in the consultation of the chiefs, which implies collaborative efforts between the two bodies. 
However, this process rarely happens. In a Western district, one of the assembly appointees was the queen 
mother. The chiefs were not consulted in her selection (as the law requires); rather she received a letter 
from the government requesting her participation (B.6.1 2010). When asked whether she would give 
information to the district assembly about the Traditional Council’s activities, she said, “No—information 
will only be passed the other way around” (B.7.1 2010). This seems like a common mind-set for both the 
assembly and traditional authorities. Collaboration implies information sharing; thus it is actually avoided 
in most circumstances. This makes the functional role of the traditional appointee on the district assembly 
questionable. It also exemplifies the power struggle, or mutual threat, between the two institutions. 
Based on the above and other findings, consistent and genuine collaboration between the state 
and customary institutions seems difficult to achieve. Constitutional state formal rules also further deter 
collaboration. While not one interviewee felt the role of the chief in development should be ignored, 
district executives and assembly members were quick to say that they are not to involve themselves in the 
affairs of the chiefs. Moreover, some laws that might induce collaboration are irrelevant in today’s 
government structure. Although Ghana’s Constitution requires that the Lands Commission consult the 
chiefs on the development of their stool, this is no longer the central government’s responsibility. Since 
decentralization, the district assemblies do the majority of stool development. 
There are additional explanations for why the state and chiefs choose to collaborate. When chiefs 
have few resources, they seem more likely to work together with their district assembly member if she has 
few resources as well. In the electrification example described above, the subchief said that while he 
collects a “small token” from the Traditional Council, he does not receive any distribution from the 
divisional’s “top-secret” OASL royalties (C.5.1 2010). It was not entirely evident, then, how he receives 
the money to contribute to projects, although he did add that his major source of his income is farming. 
While chiefs with higher resources do contribute to development, no cases were found in which they 
collaborate with the district assembly. This will be illustrated in other patterns of interaction. 
A final explanation for collaboration comes from the chieftaincy. Where collaboration occurs, it 
appears that strong customary formal rules that encourage good stewardship and oversight are also 
present. In the electrification example, the divisional chief had high expectations of his subchiefs. The 18 
subchief explained that the divisional chief expects him to donate to projects like these if financially 
capable (C.5.1 2010). In other cases where the divisional chief did not expect certain behavior or interact 
with his subchiefs, contribution and collaboration were limited. 
Noninteraction 
Defining Noninteraction 
The opposite of collaboration, noninteraction occurs when the state and customary actors, although living 
and working in the same community, do not involve themselves with the other. It is the most common 
interaction between two institutions at the local level. Noninteraction is not a problem by nature; 
however, it is a problem when the development of a district is directly and negatively affected. 
Illustrations of noninteraction and its consequences are presented below. 
Examples of Noninteraction 
The first example of noninteraction is also a conflict within the chieftaincy; however, it is discussed here 
because of its implications for the district and the assembly member. In the particular community in this 
example, there are 12 clans with 12 clan heads, who rotate as the subchief. The purpose of rotating the 
subchief title among clan heads is to maintain some overarching order in the community. However, the 
subchief does not have more authority over land compared with the other clan heads. This case involves a 
telephone company, which constructed two network towers over the course of three years within the 
community. The towers fell within the land boundaries of one of the clan heads (A.9.1 2010). The 
prospectors who came to lease land for the first pole went directly to the subchief, as companies typically 
do. When the subchief realized that these prospectors were not surveying his land, he went to appropriate 
clan head to alert him of their request (A.2.1 2010). After confirming the site for construction, the clan 
head never heard from the telephone company again. Additional network prospectors approached the clan 
head’s predecessor some years later. In this case, the clan head formalized and signed a compensation 
contract (or drink money agreement) with the company, a step that he knew did not transpire with the 
original pole. Thus the clan head realized that he should have been compensated for the land the first time 
(A.9.1 2010; A.2.1 2010). Suspecting that the subchief unfairly appropriated the compensation, the clan 
head went to the police and tried to bring him to the state court (A.3.1 2010; A.5.1 2010; A.9.1 2010). 
The subchief was not arrested for the accusation, and eventually the case was given to the King of Gonja 
because it was considered a customary dispute. At the time of interviewing, sanctions had not ensued. 
The most important aspect of this case is the lack of state involvement. When the police were first 
called to the situation, the district assembly member was also, but only as an observer (A.2.1 2010). When 
asked about land acquisition and the conflict concerning this case, an executive officer explained that 
foreign companies must come to the district offices for a building permit, but neither he nor the other 
district officers are involved in land transfers or drink money agreements (A.1 2010). Not only does this 
leave the district without any control of the land, but it also restricts community development. This 
conflict was a serious one, dividing the community and damaging clan relationships. Moreover, because 
of the conflict, the district assembly member feels that his attempts to bring development to his 
community are somewhat ineffective. With clans in dispute, consensus on project sites and building 
processes is always difficult to achieve. This is further challenging because clans organize around 
political parties. Due to these difficulties, the district assembly often chooses not to interact with the clan 
heads unless he needs to request land. 
This kind of criminal behavior within the chieftaincy frequently spreads into private and state 
affairs as well. A district assembly member in another case elaborated on the difficulties of ensuring 
transparency between the chiefs and the companies (D.2.2 2010). Recently, he and others had discovered 
a document proving that a mining company had been giving large sums of money to an unknown person 
(assumed to be a chief) for years. This money, according to the agreement, was supposed to be used for 
“development purposes” (D.2.2 2010). Yet no one in the district government had seen these funds or the 19 
projects from them. Because state actors do not interact with the customary institution when land or drink 
money is transferred, there is little oversight over these processes. 
Another example of noninteraction is quite different. A divisional chief who receives gold mining 
royalties in the Western region contributes significant funds to development projects in the district. 
However, he did not channel these funds through the district assembly; rather, he constructed his own 
buildings and led his own projects. Given the extensive funds that the divisional chief poured into 
development projects in this stool territory, it became essential to ask where exactly this money was being 
used. All interviewees stated that these funds remain within the divisional chief’s community, implying 
that the 20–30 communities within the stool land receive little if any assistance from his benevolent deeds 
(B.2.1 2010). When asked whether subchiefs or stool residents could request and receive assistance from 
the divisional chief, most respondents said “sometimes”; however, there were no concrete examples of 
this assistance. Within the divisional chief’s community, these development funds were put towards 
development projects like community center construction, furniture for classrooms, teachers’ salaries 
(B.3.1 2010). Scholarships, like the development projects, are also exclusive.  They are only given to 
those students who are doing well in school and whose mother is from the Wassa area (B.7.1 2010). 
Like in the previous example, the customary actor does not interact with the district assembly 
member (B.2.1 2010). The district assembly member, in clear agitation, explained that he is “completely 
uninformed” and never consulted about how the chief spends his royalties for development projects. 
According to him, the divisional chief purposely circumvents him and gives the money to the Unit 
Committee members. Because of this exclusion, he no longer lives within his own electoral area. When 
asked why he thought the divisional chief chose to sidestep him from this process, he replied, “Because 
the Unit Committee members are the royals” (B.2.1 2010). Thus, while the divisional chief is 
collaborating with these state actors, they are likely more allegiant to the customary institution because of 
their royalty. 
Although the divisional chief’s community benefits from his royalties, inequality in the district 
increases. This is not an immediate problem, but because the district assembly is not yet capable to 
perform a proper needs assessment, some communities like this one receive far more assistance than 
others. As stated by both state and customary actors, this will eventually result in conflict between 
communities. Moreover, the district assembly is often unaware of the divisional chief’s activities. Lack of 
interaction allows for overlap in projects, resulting in wasted resources. However, in more positive light, 
this noninteraction does produce the “leadership effect”—in which the traditional and local state leaders 
positively reinforce each others’ development efforts (Logan 2009). Despite his frustrations, the district 
assembly member in same community as the wealthy divisional chief personally visits nearby gold 
mining companies and requests assistance. In the past two years, this has included 7.5 miles of road 
construction, 36 computers, teachers’ quarters, and a clinic (B.2.1 2010). 
Explaining Noninteraction through Rules and Resources 
First of all, the findings demonstrate that most noninteraction occurs when resources are asymmetric. In 
the first example, the resources for the district assembly member are assumed to be higher than those of 
the clan heads. Because they are not part of the main tradition in the area, the clan heads do not receive 
any OASL royalties from the traditional council or divisional chiefs. Moreover, whereas most 
communities have only one subchief who oversees the land and collects drink money, this community has 
12 clan heads, which limits monetary resources for each head. The district assembly member also seems 
to carry a higher status in the community as well; this is likely due to his attempts to unify the community 
for development purposes. In the second example, the divisional chief has many resources. As a result of 
Ghana’s damp and tropical climate, his resources stretch far beyond gold, which also results in foreign 
investment and increased drink money for the chief. Although the chiefs rarely discuss their royalty 
figures and are not legally required to publicize how they are used, this particular divisional chief did. 
Four interviewees confirmed that he receives approximately 120,000 cedi (or US$83,000) per year (B.3.1 20 
2010; B.6.1 2010).
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State rules seem fairly ineffective in reducing the negative effects and prevalence of 
noninteraction. Ghana’s Constitution encourages noninterference. Thus, even if a conflict between the 
chiefs leads to community conflict and stalled projects, the state actor will not intervene. These 
consequences are even more serious when the noninteraction breeds corruption between companies and 
chiefs. Another challenge stemming from state formal rules is the restricted ability of the district assembly 
to become involved in the development activities of the chiefs. While one could argue that the chiefs are 
the owners of the land and their royalties—thus they should not be required to share information—if their 
activities meddle with those of the local government, it is logical that sharing information would enhance 
efficiency. Chiefs can hire their own contractors and lead their own projects. Clan heads can authorize a 
telephone pole. With the consent of the traditional authority, factories are opened and subsequently 
abandoned, all without the district assembly’s involvement. 
 To put this figure into perspective, the Ghanaian gross national income per capita is 
a little under US$700 (United Nations 2008). Clearly, his financial resources are much higher than those 
of the unpaid district assembly member. 
Customary formal rules are also ineffective in noninteraction cases. Divisional chiefs are not 
required to distribute their royalties, which limits the subchiefs’ ability to contribute and keeps resources 
in a single community (B.7.1 2010; B.6.1 2010). Moreover, customary rules do not always prevent and 
deal with conflict effectively, as seen in the first example. 
Informal rules also affect noninteraction. In the first case, the clans were politicized and aligned 
with certain political parties. This made interaction with the district assembly difficult (A.1 2010; A.5.1 
2010). Clearly, informal property rights that leave decisionmaking to the chiefs reinforce noninteraction if 
chiefs have incentives to keep drink money figures secret. 
Conflict within the Chieftaincy 
Defining Conflict within the Chieftaincy 
Conflict within the chieftaincy comes in many forms. Gate disputes, drink money, and boundary 
disagreements lead to conflict within the customary institution. These conflicts are often resolved through 
the traditional judicial system. In both regions, interviewees narrated these conflicts and their 
consequences. However, we do not need to present specific examples of this interaction because conflicts 
between state and customary actors are narrated in other parts of the paper.  Yet the consequences and 
causes of conflict within the chieftaincy do necessitate discussion. 
There are a number of serious consequences to chiefly conflict. As already illustrated, in some 
instances, chieftaincy disputes cause public servants to request transfers and investors to leave (D.2.2 
2010). In a Northern district, a chief’s participation in mobilizing community labor seemed positive until 
a conflict arose between him and another chief. Out of fear of being identified as supporting one chief, 
community members refused to provide communal labor for the market project (D.2.2 2010). Conflicts 
also distract the youth. In the north, more than 40 youth rallied to defend the chief that they supported. 
Not only did this put the communities on the verge of riot, but it also resulted in reduced farming activity 
(A.2.1 2010). Perhaps more seriously, some of these conflicts lead to opportunities for state and 
customary collusion, as it raises the traditional authorities’ incentives to partner with politicians under the 
table. 
Explaining Conflict within the Chieftaincy through Rules and Resources 
Customary formal rules clearly play a role in creating and sustaining these conflicts. For one, some 
traditions make conflict easier than others. For example, in the Northern region, the Gonja tradition 
rotates gates for patrilineal succession, but that succession is debatable (A.1 2010). This means that if the 
king considers the candidate at the gate “incapable of doing his job,” he can nominate another royal 
(D.4.1 2010). In addition, all people in the royal family who want to become a chief must go through 
                                                       
13 Though the divisional chief was not present, his caretaker and the queen mother were interviewed. 21 
years of service to achieve eligibility. Traditions observed in the Western region are very different. Not 
only is the tradition matrilineal, but chiefs are enstooled based on seniority. Thus, when a chief position 
opens, the eldest son in the appropriate gate takes the position—no questions asked (B.7.1 2010). This 
results in longer chieftaincy reigns in the west, which might reduce gate openings. Reduced gate openings 
mean less opportunity for conflict. More importantly, although debated succession uses democratic 
principles, findings suggest that candidate contestation in the north is not always public. Thus the 
paramount chief may not make the most equitable decisions when choosing a candidate. 
Purely economic motives also increase the severity of the conflicts. The increase in land valuation 
and foreign investment serve as strong incentives for intertraditional disputes. This becomes a serious 
problem when state oversight is negligible: District assembly members will only interfere in chief 
conflicts when there is a threat of violence (A.3.1 2010). 
Collusion 
Defining Collusion 
Collusion between the state and customary institutions occurs between many different actors. For the 
purposes of this study, collusion is considered any relationship or exchange between the traditional and 
state bodies that violates the formal state law and results in negative outcomes. It also frequently involves 
corruption. Two examples are discussed below. 
Examples of Collusion 
The first example involves police and the chief in collusion, yet the federal government was mentioned as 
a colluder as well. In the Western region, illegal mining is a common and problematic practice. Though 
interviewees called these activities “illegal mining,” it is actually the practices used to mine that are 
illegal. The Ghanaian mine operators who come to the region actually have licenses to mine; however, 
they frequently use cheap, illegal practices that are hazardous to both the environment and the 
community. Though these practices are criminal, the local police do little about the problem. According to 
the district assembly member, this is because the subchief, who receives mining revenues from the 
operators, pays the police to allow the activities to continue (C.2.1 2010). Thus the police pardon the chief 
and the mine operators in return for cash. The subchief in this case also explained that the miners pay 
hefty fees to the government for their licenses to operators. In his opinion, this makes the mining a win–
win situation for both the central government and the chiefs (C.5.2 2010). In this case, the district 
assembly member had no control over the situation or its negative consequences. 
The second example illustrates colluding behavior between the federal government and a 
divisional chief. In a Northern district, the local police and district assembly member interfered in a 
quickly escalating chieftaincy dispute. For unknown reasons, the military arrived and removed only one 
of the chiefs from the area. When the district assembly member was asked why only this chief was 
removed, he replied, “Probably to protect him” (D.2.1 2010). Subsequently, this chief was enstooled as 
the divisional chief, although many interviewees felt that he did not maintain rights to the stool. It was 
later found that not only did this chief sympathize with the party in power, but he was also the uncle of 
the DCE (D.4.1 2010). 
Explaining Collusion through Rules and Resources 
Informal rules are essential to encouraging and allowing collusion between the two institutions. 
Partisanship motivates politicians to gain chiefs’ support, which means that state officials—both federal 
and local—might pardon traditional authorities in exchange for their political assistance. Other informal 
rules permit collusion and corruption as well. Because the consequences for criminal action within the 
chieftaincy are so severe (like automatic destoolment) (C.12 2010), both the public and district officials 
are wary of enforcing legal behavior. 22 
Formal state rules regarding royalty transparency also cause collusion. The lack of bank 
statements and financial documentation for drink money promotes confusion and reduced clarity on land 
transfers (A.5.1 2010). Financial transfers within the chieftaincy or from the chieftaincy to the state are 
not public. Even the OASL, who will provide royalty figures to the public, is slow to do so. In addition, 
findings suggest that the subchiefs do not typically know the royalty figures of their division, and the 
district assembly members do not know them for their district. Where this is the case, opportunities for 
collusion and illegal exchanges between actors of the two institutions are high. 
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6. CONCLUSIONS 
Forming Hypotheses 
The patterns of interaction described in Section 5.4 raise a number of important issues, the first of which 
serves as the building block for policy implications and conclusions. After toying with and reanalyzing 
the patterns of interaction and supporting examples, we found trends in the resources, rules, and 
incentives. It appears that certain combinations of these three variables can predict interactions between a 
state and a customary actor. Thus we hypothesize about the conditions under which the four 
interactions—collaboration, noninteraction, collusion, and conflict within the chieftaincy—occur. 
Informal rules are not included in these hypotheses because they did not differentiate significantly 
between patterns of interaction. This is not to suggest that they are irrelevant; rather, our case study did 
not gather sufficient information to discuss them in the hypotheses. Table 4 highlights the combinations 
of resources, incentives, and formal rules-in-use that produce certain interactions. Conflict within the 
chieftaincy is also included, as the findings suggest that it sometimes leads to collusion with the state. 
Table 4. Hypotheses on the four patterns of interaction between the state and customary 
institutions 
    Noninteraction  Collaboration  Conflict w/in 
Chieftaincy  Collusion 
Resources    Many, asymmetric  Few, symmetric  Not applicable  Many, symmetric 
Incentives  Mutual threat 
Retain resources to 
keep power 
Exchange in hopes of 
more power 
Personal attempt to 
avoid threat 
Exchange in hopes of 
more power 
  Moral ethics  Maintain status quo  Seen as a contributor  Seen as a leader  Can blame other 




higher rank, or 
respect 
Gain chief position 
or land 
Gain more votes, 
higher rank, or 
pardon 
  Resource gain  Keep them  Complemented  Keep them  Complemented 
Rules-in-use  State formal  Constitution upheld  LGA upheld  Not applicable  Constitution/LGA 
violated 
  Customary 
formal 
Not applicable  Rules are stronger 
than normal  Rules are violated  Rules are violated 
Source: Author. 
The following paragraphs elaborate on these hypotheses. 
Noninteraction occurs when resources are asymmetric and where state formal rules are effective at 
discouraging interference. In these cases, resources are concentrated in the hand of one institutional actor, 
thus providing the resource-rich actor with the incentives and power to avoid engaging the opposing 
institution. While Ghana’s Constitution actively discourages interaction, the customary formal rules say 
little about it. Informal rules that reinforce nontransparency also discourage interaction between the two 
bodies. 
Collaboration occurs when resources are few and symmetric and when customary formal rules are 
strong. Resources must also be complementary. If resources are asymmetric, this interaction would likely 
become noninteraction. Yet it must also be noted that in most cases where collaboration was observed, the 
customary formal rules related to community stewardship were high. Subchiefs were also more 
accountable to divisionals. State formal rules are largely inapplicable to this pattern because they do not 
make any specific demands on either institution to collaborate with the other. Because the LGA 
encourages the district assembly to collaborate with other actors (generally) in the district, it could be said 
that the LGA is upheld. In the electrification case, the chief gave financial resources to the district 
assembly member in exchange for an increase in positional status in the community. 24 
Conflict within the chieftaincy occurs when customary formal rules are weak. Resources only serve as an 
incentive for conflict. While customary rules are weak in this interaction, state rules do not play a role. It 
could be proposed that in dangerous or violent conflict, both the customary and state institutions lack the 
ability to enforce formal rules. This interaction is important not only because it results in negative 
development outcomes but also because it leads to collusion in some cases. If chiefs are in conflict, a state 
actor can interfere if he has complementary resources and incentives to do so. 
Collusion occurs when resources are asymmetric and high and when state and customary formal rules 
are easily violated. Resources, just like in collaboration, must also be complementary. Though incentives 
like moral ethics still influence the actors in this interaction, it is unlikely that rule violations will be 
exposed. The strength of informal rules also reduces chances of serious exposure. Partisanship and chiefly 
respect reinforce public acceptance of corrupt behavior. In the illegal mining example, the subchief gave 
financial resources to the local police in exchange for pardon. 
What the Patterns of Interaction Mean for Governance with Dual Institutions 
The hypotheses above are included in this paper to promote future research on these topics. We are not 
claiming that they hold true for all situations, as the interactions and exchanges between state and 
customary actors are highly circumstantial. Other variables not captured in this study likely influence 
them as well. 
Nonetheless, we can use these hypotheses to discuss policy implications. Bringing the discussion 
back to local government and development outcomes, the question remains: What interaction between the 
two institutions leads to the best local development outcome? Based on the findings, the answer is 
collaboration. In some cases, noninteraction is also effective in bringing development because it increases 
positive competitive behavior in the two institutions. Thus the follow-up question is, Are there ways in 
which policymakers can increase collaboration, or at the least, mitigate negative consequences in 
situations with noninteraction, conflict, or collusion? 
By reexamining the resources available, rules-in-use, and incentives, one can discuss how 
changes in these variables might shift results in patterns of interactions and outcomes. Formal and 
informal rules certainly play a role in generating these incentives as well as accountability within the 
institutions. However, informal rules have deep roots in society and are not easily changed; neither are 
customary formal rules, due to their cultural implications. Some rules on resources could be revised, but 
the resources themselves are more difficult to change through policy. Indeed, of the three variables, state 
formal rules-in-use are undoubtedly the quickest to modify, though this is not to say changing them is 
easy. The following four topics are the most prominent concerns raised by the state–customary 
interactions and exchanges found in this study. Considering the hypotheses, revising some of the state 
formal rules might lead to improved local outcomes. 
Transparency 
Lack of transparency in land transfers, drink money, projects, party politics, and even in exchanges 
themselves certainly leads to negative patterns of interaction. Transparency, even in cases with 
noninteraction, led to better development outcomes. Public disclosure helps to hold both the government 
and customary institutions accountable for their action and interactions or exchanges with one another. 
More transparent rules would have a number of positive consequences. They would reduce transaction 
costs and uncertainty in institutional interactions. They would also improve incentive structures, as actors 
could not maintain moral ethics or achieve political reward if publicly participating in activities like 
collusion or corruption. 
Various formal rules could be modified to encourage transparency. Making royalties more 
publicly available or fixing them at a certain rate might reduce the resource effects in the interactions. At 
the least, creating a code of ethics for using royalties in both institutions could lower the incentives for 
exchanging resources for culpable purposes. Posting who contributed to what project in communities 
might increase the leadership effect as well. 25 
Consultative Processes 
Though some formal rules require the state actors to consult the chiefs on certain matters, these rules are 
often either unenforced or irrelevant. Moreover, it seems that there are few rules requiring that the chiefs 
consult the state on their activities. This leads to the inefficient use of resources. It also results in 
noninteraction. If one institutional actor has more resources than the other, they are incentivized to keep 
their resources. However, if required to consult one another—even despite differences in resources—the 
poor effects of noninteraction like project overlap might be reduced. 
More frequent meetings between the two institutions at a local level could increase information 
sharing. This might also increase the voice of subchiefs, which would enhance their ability to contest 
decisions of divisional and paramount chiefs. Formal rules could also require that chiefs’ contributions or 
development projects be included in the district assembly budget. This might help reduce inefficiency. 
Management and Roles 
The ability of the state to manage both the customary and its own institution is limited. While the 
customary institution manages some of its own affairs, because the NHC, RHC, and Traditional Councils 
are state bodies, some of these management responsibilities lie with the state. Difficulties managing the 
customary institution might be due to the ambiguous formal rules that are purposed to guide state actors. 
Though the LGA encourages collaboration with various actors, it says little about how the district 
assembly member should interact with the chief. This causes uncertainty in local state officials when 
problems arise with the traditional authorities in their jurisdiction. Uncertainty then makes incentives like 
mutual threat more apparent as well. 
Defining the role of the chief in local government policy might help to improve management 
processes. A clear cutting of the traditional authorities’ role could also reduce internal threat between the 
two institutions by mitigating competition. The local government could also reward chiefs who 
collaborate or contribute their funds or energy, which may enhance their incentives to participate. The 
state might also reconsider haphazard allowances; standardizing (while publicizing) allowances and 
payments to chiefs or councils could perhaps diminish opportunities for collusion and chiefly conflict. 
Enforcement and Sanctions 
Enforcement of formal rules is one of the main challenges in achieving positive patterns of interaction. As 
demonstrated, informal rules play a major role in allowing nonenforcement. Partisanship and rules that 
demand devoted chiefly respect deter the state to enforce its formal rules. Thus, there are many 
opportunities for criminal behavior, collusion, and corruption in the dual governance structure. As stated 
previously, monitoring and policing every interaction between the two institutions would be impossible. 
Nonetheless, increasing some enforcement of the formal rules is the only way to curtail shady exchanges. 
Sanctioning crime and corruption would disincentivize collusion. 
Clearly, enforcing sanctions for chiefs who break the law would reduce criminal behavior. 
Formal state rules that address some of the chieftaincy disputes might also prove useful. Conflict leads to 
negative development consequences. Thus the state might consider a more serious role when these 
conflicts arise. Finally, if the law that demands nonpartisan behavior from chiefs stays the same, the state 
could also perhaps enforce nonpartisan behavior. 
Prospects for Change and the Future of Decentralization 
As demonstrated, there are many areas for policy change concerning the relationship between chiefs and 
local state officials. Yet with four sets of rules, two strong institutions, and a multitude of actors, major 
reforms regarding transparency, enforcement, management, and consultation are unlikely in the short 
term. Moreover, the strong incentive structures that encourage exchange between the actors are a serious 
challenge to policy intervention. It can be assumed that the power in these exchanges becomes even more 
pronounced as authority increases in the institutional hierarchies. Notwithstanding the challenges to 26 
policy transformation, small strategic steps toward rule modification and enforcement are necessary for 
economic development. This is especially true given chiefs’ continuous influence at the local level. 
The findings raise serious practical and theoretical implications for decentralization efforts in 
countries with strong traditional systems, as it seems that the management of these systems—specifically 
in democratic contexts—continues to daunt policymakers and scholars. Fanthrope (2006) writes that 
chieftaincy is the historical cause for political struggles in the Sierra Leonean countryside. Karlstro (1996) 
reports that people in Uganda rarely distinguish between elected leaders and nonelected ones. Since the 
end of apartheid, politicians have argued over the extent to which the chiefs should be incorporated into 
the democratic regime (Ntsebeza 2004; Mokgoro 1996). These are only a few examples of the theoretical 
and practical questions regarding traditional authorities today. Clearly, exploring and defining local-level 
relationships between customary and state actors is essential to future decentralization efforts. 
The first practical matter highlighted in the analysis is the impact of ineffective or unenforced 
formal rules. As illustrated, if rules remain unchanged and irrelevant, opportunities for corruption and 
conflict increase in colonial contexts. Over time, the incentives that strengthen the power struggle 
between the state and the customary authorities result in more competition than collaboration, even 
despite actors’ good intentions. Specific roles and authorities of the traditional leaders were never defined 
in Ghana’s decentralization policy. Based on the findings, it appears that this ambiguity allows chiefs to 
interfere with the development efforts of the local government body. Moreover, because chiefs maintain 
political power and respect in communities, the elected district assembly member is less likely to involve 
himself in chieftaincy issues even when necessary. 
The study also confirms that formal and informal rule sets reinforce exchange organizations 
based on incentives. This is even more complex where both strong customary and state institutions 
coexist. It seems that when these two institutions have complementary resources, opportunity for 
interaction increases. Thus when resources are available for exchange, collaboration or collusion occurs 
depending on the rule sets employed, the amount of resources available, and the strength of incentives. If 
this holds true in other countries, more focus should be placed on formal rules that systematically 
incentivize collaboration and sanction collusion. 
From a democratic lens, accountability mechanisms might also help to do the above. The 
transaction cost perspective also suggests that some accountability mechanisms reduce monitoring and 
policing costs. Given this positive viewpoint, it is possible that a subchief could serve as a public 
watchdog for the district assembly member and vice versa. In this regard, while the importance of 
accountability mechanisms in democratic government is widely acknowledged, interinstitutional 
mechanisms in colonial contexts have not received much scholarly attention. If one can hypothesize under 
what conditions actors in the state and traditional institutions interact, it might be possible to generate 
checks and balances between the two bodies. However, it must also be stated that state formal rules 
typically define the ways in which these mechanisms are permitted and encouraged to function. Thus if 
strong incentives dissuade interference with or regulation of the customary body, like in Ghana’s case, 
state politicians are somewhat unlikely to generate this space for interinstitutional accountability. These 
potential mechanisms should be considered for future research. 
To conclude, patterns of interaction between the state and customary institutions affect the efforts 
of the local government and result in unpredictable community development outcomes. This study 
demonstrates the complexity of decentralization in colonial contexts, in which four sets of rules 
incentivize nontransparent exchanges between customary and state institutions. Accountability 
mechanisms and official roles for traditional authorities that might enhance development are therefore 
more difficult to introduce, especially after years of unaltered policy. If modernization does not in fact 
result in the quick abatement of traditional powers, decisionmakers in other countries should consider 
more seriously the study and inclusion of these actors in local government structures. Proactive policy, 
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